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I. INTRODUCTION 
Making the distribution of income less unequal and achieving higher 
levels of total output per capita are two of the major goals of economic 
performance in less developed countries. However desirable these ambitions 
might be, an enormous volume of literature in economics has stressed that 
simultaneous satisfaction of both goals may not be possible. There may be a 
basic incompatibility between these objectives of economic policy if higher 
output levels require greater income inequality or if measures which provide 
more equal incomes also produce reductions in total income. 
Empirical work by Simon Kuznets has confirmed that in the early stages 
of economic development and sustained growth the distribution of income 
appears to widen markedly.' Only at a much later stage of development is 
there a change towards less inequality in incomes earned. Although the 
discovery of initial divergence and later convergence in income distribution 
has aroused considerable speculation and curiosity on the part of economists, 
only very tentative explanations for it have been advanced so far. Most of 
these refer to the relative abundance of labor in the early stages and the 
positive role an unequal income distribution plays in promoting saving and 
capital accumulation, which will eventually make labor a scarce factor of 
production. Although it is imperfectly understood, Kuznets's observation is 
widely accepted as almost an immutable law of economic development and 
growth. 
Reaction to the constraints imposed on economic policy by the apparent 
trade-off in economic goals has frequently involved attaching greater weight 
to one or the other of them. Some groups now draw a distinction between 
growth and development and argue that the latter requires raising the relative 
income of the very poor regardless of the growth rate achieved. They are 
prepared to accept slower growth rates of output in pursuing the income dis- 
tribution objective. Others reject this position in favor of growth-promoting 
strategies and see the distributional issue as posing a challenge to the flexi- 
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bility of fiscal policy. They would rely on a variety of fiscal measures to 
redistribute market incomes to lower income groups as the best means of 
reconciling the conflict in objectives. Groups with above average incomes 
who benefit in particular from economic growth would be taxed to finance 
income transfers and government expenditures that aid low income members 
of the economy. 
While there may be a great deal of truth t o  the conflict notion as a broad 
description of development trends, it is probably dangerous and misleading 
to view it as inevitable in the context of specific policies affecting particuIar 
sectors of the economy. In Latin America, policies to promote and accelerate 
the process of economic growth have typically relied upon import substitu- 
tion efforts and rigorous governmental influence in the sectoral distribution 
of resources. Colombia's recent economic experience is ample testimony of 
such broad governmental impact. Government policy in that country is the 
dominant force in the setting of foreign exchange and interest rates, the 
variety of effective fax and subsidy rates for different firms and industries, 
minimum wage regulations, tariffs, and quantitative trade restrictions. In 
short, there is a wide panoply of laws regulating many kinds of market 
transactions. In affecting the terms under which different economic groups 
and sectors may have access to resources, these restrictions frequently distort 
the use of resources and prevent their efficient allocation in the economy as 
a whole. Economists traditionally have been intrigued with describing and 
measuring the loss in economic efficiency or the welfare cost of this kind of 
policy discrimination. Only recently has much attention been devoted to the 
consequences these actions may have for income distribution. Since they 
normally work to raise the relative price of abundant factors (especially 
labor) and thus reduce demand for them, it is becoming increasingly recog- 
nized and accepted that these policies accentuate inequalities in income. If 
this is true, a shift in existing government policy may be able to  achieve both 
a higher level of total output and less inequality in income distribution. It 
may lie within relatively easy reach of governments in less developed coun- 
tries to eliminate much of the competitive relationship between growth and 
income distribution and to impose a stronger complementarity between 
these goals. 
In what follows there is a review and discussion of some research seeking 
to assess the efficiency and equity aspects of some major government policies 
that are important in influencing the direction of development in Colombia's 
agricultural sector.2 These policies consist of measures to affect the distribu- 
tion of physical capital resources through land reform and subsidies to large 
farm purchase of capital goods (mechanization) and the distribution of 
human capitalin the form of access to educational opportunities. In addition, 
there are rural credit policies which affect the pattern of use of variable 
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production inputs such as seed and fertilizer, and agricultural price support 
policies, which determine the returns farmers receive from the sale of output. 
In each of these five policy areas some empirical evidence is marshaled to see 
whether it offers any support for the basic hypothesis that a reconstruction of 
existing policies could both equalize the distribution and raise the level of 
total income. With but one possible exception, subsequent sections strongly 
suggest that a transfer of real resources to smaller farms and less policy 
favoritism towards larger ones would be not only equitable but efficient as 
well. 
11. AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORTS 
As in many countries, Colombia's experience with agricultural price 
supports originated in the depression of the 1930s in response to severe 
balance of payments difficulties. Thereafter, price supports became part of 
an overall import substitution strategy of economic development in which 
the agency responsible for setting and maintaining domestic price leveIs 
sought to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural production. This agency 
relied on its nearly exclusive right to import agricultural commodities under 
a system of foreign exchange licensing in order to validate its system of price 
supports. Levels of support were determined annually on the basis of 
estimates of the average cost of domestic production, including a normal 
rate of return on investment. 
Because it is privileged to buy crops at world prices and sell at higher 
domestic prices and, to a lesser extent, because its normal price-stabilizing 
activities require buying low and selling dear, the price support agency earns 
trading profits that are used to finance the costs of operation and the costs 
of storage. Supply adjustments from crop inventories and imports provide 
the agency with ample leverage for controlling the movement of domestic 
prices. Except for wheat, which remains a sizable import item, the agency 
has been successful in reducing dependence on foreign sources of supply for 
a large number of crops. The price paid for greater autarky (economic self- 
sufficiency) is a structure of domestic crop production whose costs of output 
in many cases are substantially above world price levels. Some portion of 
this cost difference is attributable to persistent over-valuation of the Colom- 
bian peso, which artificially depresses the foreign exchange cost of imports. 
Moreover, in the case of one crop, cotton, an import substitution phase was 
soon followed by an export phase as the country acquired sufficient experi- 
ence in growing the crop to be able to sell it in world markets without price 
assistance. For some crops, supply has shown a consistent tendency to 
outpace growth in demand, with a consequent accumulation of unsold out- 
put that eventually has been sold abroad at a loss. For example, in 1969 corn 
and rice inventories bulged and were reduced to more manageable size by 
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sale to foreigners with the aid of a budgetary subsidy worth 32.5 million 
pesos (about 1.82 million dollars). In the presence of an overvalued exchange 
rate, however, there is a strong resource allocation argument for export 
subsidies, one form of which is the losses sustained by a government market- 
ing agency. Export losses would be inappropriate only if the implicit subsidy 
on export sales exceeded the extent of the overvaluation. 
In analyzing the income distribution consequences of this price support 
program, consideration is given both to how different income groups earn 
their income and to how they spend it. This approach has the advantage of 
focusing on the change in the real income position of any income group that 
is produced by a change in price support policy. Previous studies have 
ignored the expenditure side of household accounts and have concentrated 
exclusively on how various programs affect the nominal earnings or income 
of farmers.3 The methodology adopted for Colombia obliterates the dis- 
tinction between rural and urban members of an income class and emphasizes 
redistribution among income classes regardless of the sector of the economy 
in which members of any class work or reside.4 While it offers a desirably 
broad perspective on the redistribution question, the methodology neglects 
significant redistribution within income classes in order to emphasize that 
occurring between income classes. 
Another important methodological matter revolves around the appro- 
priate counterfactual situation. If the price support program were abandoned, 
what price situation would prevail in its absence? The simplest situation 
would be one in which domestic crop prices fell to world price levels. If this 
occurred, there would be much greater demand for imported crop commod- 
ities and consequent upward pressure on the exchange rate. Under these 
circumstances a meaningful price comparison would be with existing world 
price levels adjusted for depreciation of the Colombian peso. Since the 
extent of any depreciation is unknown, an interesting and policy-relevant 
base for comparison is the structure of world prices that would rule if the 
current overvaluation of the peso were removed. This would involve aug- 
menting world prices by approximately 30-35%, which many economists 
judge to be a rough order of magnitude of the current overvaluation. In any 
event, without a fully specified mode1 of the economy it is important to 
account for as many relative price changes as possible in comparing actual 
and hypothetical income distributions. 
With the aid of an input-output model of the Colombian economy, it was 
possible to partition the agricultural sector into five income classes and 
eight price-supported crops, showing how much each income group spent 
on each crop and how much it earned in producing the crop. For each crop 
the data indicated that another dollar added to the price of the crop would 
cause larger increases in expenditures than in earnings for the low income 
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groups and greater additions to earnings than to expenditures for the high 
income groups. Because the poor invariably spend more on any crop than 
they earn in producing it and the reverse situation applies for the rich, 
eliminating the system of price supports would redistribute income from rich 
to poor in most cases. Only for rice and barley, in which cases adjusted world 
prices equal domestic market prices, would the rich-to-poor redistribution 
fail to occur. For one crop, beans, the income transfers would move the 
other way, because adjusted world prices exceed observed market prices. 
Because wheat is a large import item, all consumers and income classes, but 
especially lower ones, would benefit if price supports for it were removed. 
TO put these results in a somewhat different light, continuation of the present 
program of price supports implies a continuous redistribution of income 
from poor to rich. The real burden of price supports is borne disproportion- 
ately by low-income consumers, while most of the benefits accrue to high- 
income producers. 
An alternative way of viewing the matter is to examine changes in the 
functional distribution of income between owners of land and "owners" of 
labor. As a result of inelastic final demand, price supports raise the amount 
of total revenue to be divided between land and labor. Since labor is readily 
available in the agricultural sector and land is in relatively fixed supply, the 
impact of higher product prices will be felt in the form of higher returns to, 
and a larger income share for, the land input. As the ownership of land is 
much more highly concentrated than the ownership of labor, a higher in- 
come share for land implies more inequality in the distribution of personal 
incomes. Seen from another angle, the least labor-intenshe farms stand to 
gain the most from price supports, and these farms comprise the larger ones 
with higher initial incomes. 
In addition to  redistributing income, price supports impair the overall 
efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. The size of the efficiency 
cost is indicated by the discrepancy between domestic crop prices and 
adjusted world prices. This price margin measures, under a reasonably non- 
restrictive set of assumptions, the extra resource cost of producing a com- 
modity domestically rather than purchasing it indirectly through the sale of 
exports abroad. The extra cost is the price paid for pursuing the goal of 
self-sufficiency and failing to  specialize production according to the free 
trade concept of comparative advantage. For wheat, soybeans, and corn, the 
cost of diversification was estimated to be about 5% of the total domestic 
value of output. With respect to the total value of all crop output, it would 
be an even smaller percentage. It seems safe to conclude that the efficiency 
cost of the price support program is not unreasonably high, although it 
is a cost which is paid with no offsetting benefit of a less skewed income 
distribution. 
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111. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
Credit is an important means by which farmers acquire command over 
the use of productive inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and farm 
machinery. The use of credit to purchase large and indivisible, multi-period 
resources in the form of farm machinery and equipment is examined in the 
next section of this paper. Here attention is concentrated on how the 
credit-financed allocation of intermediate inputs, essentially seed, fertilizer, 
and irrigation, affects the distribution of farm incomes. There are many 
facets to this issue and only some of the myriad channels by which credit 
influences distribution have been subjected to empirical testing. In general, 
income distribution will be affected by who receives the credit or the size 
and kind of farm on which it is used, the price paid for its use, the produc- 
tivity of the inputs financed by credit, and the particular type of input 
purchased. Each of these matters is discussed in turn in the context of 
Colombia's credit markets. 
The price paid for institutional credit in Colombia is regulated by govern- 
ment at artificially low interest rates. About one quarter of Colombian 
farmers receive credit from some type of institutional lender. The semi- 
official agricultural bank, the Caja Agraria, accounts for slightly more than 
one half of the outstanding loans to agriculture, most of which have gone to 
relatively large farmers. Private banks likewise bias their lending activities in 
the direction of large farmers. The single source of institutional finance for 
smaller farmers is the supervised credit program of the land reform institute, 
which has accounted for about 5% of total loans outstanding and has bene- 
fited perhaps 35,000 families during the period 1964-1972. This is a small 
fraction of the approximately 850,000 small farmers (those controlling fewer 
than five hectares) who produce about 20% of all crops and 15% of all live- 
stock. 
A prominent characteristic of the credit market is a system of obligatory 
investments imposed on financial institutions for the purpose of controlling 
the allocation of credit to specific sectors. For example, private banks are 
legally required to set aside 15% of their deposits for agricultural loans. 
Credit controls of this and similar types are needed to force funds to flow 
toward agricultural activities paying lower loan rates than those charged in 
the non-agricultural sector. These controls have succeeded in siphoning off a 
growing share of total loan capacity for agriculture. Currently agriculture 
owes about 35% of total loans outstanding, compared to its share in Gross 
Domestic Product of about 30%. 
Maintaining low nominal and real rates of interest has several implications 
for income distribution. Low real rates of interest typically generate an 
excess demand for loans and force lenders to  ration their lending capacity. 
In deciding on who is to  receive credit, lenders will not be influenced by the 
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productivity of the loan, since this is not reflected in the rate paid by the 
borrower, and will instead be swayed by other considerations, such as the 
credit-worthiness of the borrower. By choosing this loan strategy the lender 
is protected against risk of default, but the result is an institutional bias in 
favor of large landowners who control more net worth. Through access to 
cheap lines of credit there may be an income transfer to wealthy borrowers 
from poor savers who do not have alternative outlets for their savings. In 
addition, many high yielding investment projects on small farms may go 
unrealized for lack of financing. As long as the return on the use of credit 
exceeds its cost, the allocation of more credit to small farmers represents a 
transfer of income-earning resources to them. If this credit is instead allo- 
cated to large farmers, they may use it to finance new capital-intensive 
technologies which diminish the demand for labor, including that of small 
farmers, and to increase their output levels, thereby reducing the prices small 
farmers receive for their output. Regardless of who receives the credit, if it is 
productive and augments total output, consumers (particularly poor ones 
who spend most of their income on food), will share in the increase in output 
by being able to purchase at lower prices. 
There are two other less obvious links between credit allocation and in- 
come distribution. First, the use of credit to  promote growth in output of 
particular crops and to alter the overall composition of crop output will 
have an effect on income distribution depending on the labor intensity of 
different crops. For example, fertilizer could be competitive with the employ- 
ment of labor if it has a high payoff in stimulating advances in the output of 
land-using, labor-saving crops. Secondly, the distribution of credit between 
large and small farmers may have serious consequences for the distribution 
of incomes between small farmers and landless workers. A larger share of 
credit garnered by small farmers that have surplus labor capacity may harm 
landless workers to the extent that small farmers hire less labor per dollar of 
credit than do larger farms. Opposing any such tendency, however, would 
be the withdrawal of labor services from the labor market by small farmers, 
so that the net effect on landless labor is in doubt. 
Because of exclusionary credit market practices that may restrict their 
opportunity to purchase intermediate inputs such as seed and fertilizer, the 
marginal productivity of these inputs may be highest on smaller farms in 
Colombia. The relative abundance of complementary labor on these farms 
also works in the same direction. A limited test of this hypothesis was per- 
formed with the aid of statistical production function analysis which per- 
mitted the estimation of marginal products on different sized farms. The test 
was limited by the available data on credit use, which described only a narrow 
range of fairly small farm sizes and which did not readily allow inferences to  
be drawn about the productivity of intermediate inputs on much larger farms. 
There is some evidence, however, that larger farms utilize even greater 
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amounts of credit per hectare than is suggested by the sample data. In this 
case the statistical results will admit of some broad, if somewhat tenuous, 
generalization. For what they are worth, the results of the production 
function analysis indicated that in six of twelve cases (crop-region combina- 
tions) the marginal productivity of credit was significantly higher on smaller 
farms. In another four cases the estimated marginal productivity was also 
higher on smaller farms but the difference was insufficiently large to be 
significant a t  the 95% confidence level. These findings receive corroboration 
from some independent studies of Brazil, which discovered that the financial 
system directed a much higher fraction of credit to  large farms displaying 
inferior productivity. It is possible that the results for Colombia illustrate a 
deficiency in the supply of long-term credit for the acquisition of land. No 
lending institution in Colombia provides financing for this purpose. Perhaps 
intermediate inputs are more productive on smaller farms because they 
substitute for land purchases that would otherwise be made. Nonetheless, for 
a number of crops and regions a reallocation of credit based on productivity 
criteria appears to offer somescope for reducing income inequality. 
IV. F A R M  MECHANIZATION 
Since the late 1940s the use of tractors and other farm machinery in 
Colombia has grown at close to an annual rate of 20%, so that by 1964 
mechanized crop production accounted for almost 50% of total crop output 
(excluding coffee). Over the same period real wages in the rural sector dis- 
played a barely perceptible rate of growth. The stimulus to mechanization 
has had its origins not so much in increasing labor scarcity as in government 
policies which have cheapened the cost of farm machinery. Both interest 
rates charged by lenders and empirical estimates of the rate of return to 
capital indicate that users of farm capital enjoy a subsidy relative to capital 
users in other parts of the economy. If the subsidy is measured as a fraction 
of either the rate of return or the cost of capital in non-agricultural activities, 
it is of the order of about 40%. In addition, farm machinery receives favor- 
able tax treatment in that it is exempt from the wealth tax and faces a much 
lower tariff (2%) than is levied on other imports of capital goods. 
Colombia's agricultural sector is composed of two distinct subsectors, a 
large farm group producing either crops or cattle and a collection of much 
smaller farms specializing in various crops. For any given crop, small farms 
are observed to use a great deal more labor per hectare than larger farms. 
Between very small crop farms and large cattle ranches as much as ten to 
fifteen times more labor per unit of land is used on the former than on the 
latter. The wide variation in factor proportions reflects different techno- 
logical choices in addition to different products. Larger farms producing 
any crop employ higher ratios of machinery to labor. According to  the 1960 
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census of agriculture, nearly 70% of all tractors were owned on farms of 
more than fifty hectares and, although small farmers tend to rent machinery 
services from larger farms, there is still a wide discrepancy in the use of farm 
machinery by farm size. From the same census data it has been estimated 
that the use of tractor horsepower per unit of labor increases by about 12% 
for every 10% increment in farm size. 
Given the opportunity of small farmers to rent machinery services, the 
evidence suggests that small farmers may value their own, or their family's, 
labor services at something less than the price large farmers pay for labor. 
Since the value that small farmers place on their own labor is likely to corre- 
spond more closely to the real cost to the economy of using labor than does 
the market wage, the concentration of farm machinery on large farms 
suggests that rural labor markets do not function well in allocating resources. 
Small farmer demands for machinery services are significantly less than 
those of larger farmers and are of a much more selective nature. When they 
hire the services of farm machinery, small farmers appear to use it almost 
exclusively for land preparation. Since this operation is crucial to improved 
yield performance and is more difficult or costly to perform with either 
human or animal labor, it may prove useful to confine mechanization to the 
land preparation phase with the aim of achieving a significant output gain at 
a relatively small cost in lost employment. 
From a sample of individual farms it is possible to put together a picture 
of the input ratios found on large-scale mechanized operations. Farms in 
this class appear to use about 1-1.4 tractor horsepower per cultivated hectare, 
7.5-8 tractor horsepower per man-year of employment, and, averaging over 
the different labor requirements for cotton, rice, and corn, about 35-40 
man-days per hectare. Comparing these input demands to those on unmech- 
anized farms at the same output level and holding other aspects of farm 
technology constant, the transition towards mechanized farm operations 
appears to result in a labor saving of about 50% for most crops. In other 
words, a 50-60 horsepower tractor with a full complement of field equipment 
probably replaces the services of from six to eight farm workers. 
A more refined substitution ratio, using service flows instead of stocks of 
men and machinery, indicates that a single tractor hour can replace, de- 
pending on the specific operation or task involved, somewhere between 
three and five man-days. Substitution rates of this magnitude were not 
necessarily realized in Colombia because in many instances mechanization 
was associated with a change in output composition whereby land use was 
switched from cattle to crops. Since cattle raising uses even less labor than 
mechanized crops require (approximately fifteen man-days per hectare in 
most regions), the diffusion of mechanical technology among large farms 
probably resulted in an increase in labor demand. Another facet of Colom- 
bian experience, however, is that the subsidy to the use of farm machinery 
88 R I C E  UNIVERSITY S T U D I E S  
has been applied to a sector which is more capital-intensive than the non- 
agricultural sector as a whole. It is this aspect of the subsidy which is largely 
responsible for the negative impact mechanization has had on employment 
and income equalization. 
To understand this result, consider a qualitative description of some of the 
economic adjustments that follow in the wake of granting a capital subsidy 
to large farms, At existing crop prices, large farmers will find it profitable to 
increase their planned levels of production as a result of diminished produc- 
tion costs. Higher output levels will be translated into lower crop prices in 
agricultural product markets. Lower priced capital will be substituted for 
labor and will stimulate a demand for the complementary input of mechani- 
zable land. Cattle ranches will supply the new demand for land. Ranchers 
will relinquish controI of some mechanizable land and substitute land less 
suitable for mechanization in its stead. As some land is bid away from cattle 
and transferred to crops, its relative price will rise, moderating the demand 
for capital and encouraging greater use of labor on large crop farms. With 
the higher price of land, the relative price of cattle will be greater than before 
and will elicit still greater consumer demand for crops. The shift in the com- 
position of output will augment the demand for labor, since crop production 
employs more labor per hectare than does cattle raising. 
The non-agricultural sector will find that capital otherwise supplied to it 
will be diverted instead to the capital-intensive large farm crop sector. With 
less capital, the rate of return earned on capital in the non-agricultural sector 
will increase. The higher price of capital will lead to higher output prices for 
the non-agricultural sector and will shift more consumer spending to crops 
and cattle. Because non-agricultural activities are on average more labor- 
intensive than large farm crops, the alteration in output mix will be associated 
with a reduction in labor demand. Offsetting this tendency is the very tight 
linkage between money wage rates and the prices of crop output. For un- 
skilled labor, money wage rates deflated by the price of crop goods display 
virtual stability over the post-war period. When crop prices decline, money 
wages would be expected to follow suit, occasioning a greater demand for 
cheaper labor in all parts of the non-agricultural sector. How income distri- 
bution is affected by these product and factor market adjustments will depend 
on the relative size and strength of the various repercussions. On the face of 
it, owners of capita1 and land appear to benefit from the resulting increase 
in the price of capital and the return to mechanizable land. Labor may also 
stand to gain, however, if it is able to escape the low incomes earned on small 
farms by finding employment in other higher paying sectors where labor 
demand rises. 
To sort these matters out more finely it seems there is no alternative to 
more rigorous quantitative analysis. Elsewhere I have constructed a small 
generalequilibrium model of the Colombian economy and used it to  simulate 
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the employment and relative price effects of subsidized farm mechanization.5 
The simulations proved to be reasonably robust in the sense that most of the 
results were little affected by alternative assumptions about the appropriate 
size of different parameters. For every simulation there was a significant 
increase in the utilization of all of the inputs employed by large crop farms: 
capital, land, and labor as well. The number of people occupied on small 
farms-where labor is assumed to go if employment cannot be obtained in 
other sectors4epended crucially on the ability of non-agricultural sectors 
to absorb more labor when the price of labor relative to the price of non- 
agricultural goods was reduced. Capital/labor ratios invariably rose in large 
farm crop operations and fell in the other sectors outside agriculture. Without 
exception the prices paid for land, capital, and non-agricultural goods in- 
creased relative to the price of labor. 
Overall the predictions of the simulation model appeared to mirror the 
trend of observable events in Colombia reasonably well: fast rates of growth 
of mechanized crop output and of all the inputs used in this sector; disap- 
pointing employment growth in non-agricultural sectors (though mechaniza- 
tion is only partially responsible for this result); a switch of some level, 
productive land from cattle to crops; increased labor productivity in mech- 
anized crops coupled with steady or declining labor productivity in small 
farm operations; modest deterioration in the relative price of crops, and a 
higher relative price for the service of land. 
One of the more interesting results is the strong possibility that greater 
labor employment on large crop farms can coincide with diminished em- 
ployment prospects for small farmers, even though the shift in output from 
cattle to crops will increase labor demand. The explanation for this result is 
that reduced employment opportunities in non-agricultural activities may 
overwhelm the expansion of employment on large crop farms. Despite the 
induced movement to a greater laborloutput ratio in non-agriculture, total 
employment in this sector may well be less, due to a lower level of output. 
After specifying how different functional income groups spend their in- 
come on crops, cattle, and non-agricultural goods, the simulation results 
were used to make an explicit calculation of the income redistribution 
implied by an altered pattern of relative prices. These calculations for alter- 
native simulations uniformly produced the result that capital owners were the 
primary beneficiaries of the subsidy to mechanization. At least three quarters 
of their gain in real income was realized at the expense of workers and small 
farmers, who experienced reductions in their real incomes. Small farmers 
became worse off on two accounts. First, mechanization reduced the prices 
they received for the sale of their output and, in addition, the total demand 
for their labor services was reduced.6 The latter effect by itself could depress 
the average income earned by small farmers by between five and ten percent. 
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Combining all sources of non-labor income, the analytic evidence strongly 
points to the finding that subsidized farm mechanization has had the effect 
of producing more pronounced inequality in the distribution of income, 
which would show a highly skewed pattern even without policies to promote 
greater farm mechanization. 
There remains the question of determining how the progress of mechaniza- 
tion has affected the overall efficiency of resource allocation. Here a number 
of offsetting influences are at work. It is alleged that there is an external 
benefit associated with mechanization in the form of a reallocation of land 
from low productivity use in raising cattle to higher productivity uses in 
growing crops. Scattered empirical evidence available seems to support this 
claim. Thus while mechanization ma) make the allocation of labor and 
capital resources less efficient, the loss in efficiency may be more than offset 
by a more efficient allocation of land. The net outcome of these conflicting 
forces is indeterminate without further information, since everything depends 
on the size of the various factor market distortions and the extent to which 
mechanization changes the allocation of different resources. 
From the results of the simulation's estimates of resource reallocation, it 
was found that the gains in total output ensuing from a better distribution of 
land were insufficient to outweigh the losses in total output attributable to a 
worse allocation of capital and labor. The welfare cost of the net loss in real 
income was less than 1% of gross national product in all cases. It is open to 
some debate whether or not losses of this magnitude should be considered 
relevant for policy making. One percent of gross national product is still a 
significant sum in absolute terms and indicates the absence of a socially 
profitable investment. Since external lenders have underwritten a large 
fraction of the cost of mechanization in Colombia, however, the welfare loss 
arises only in comparison with a neutral subsidy policy which did not offer 
any special incentives to the sectoral employment of capital. It is not so much 
that total real income has declined in response to mechanization policy as 
that it could have been higher without the discriminatory inducement to use 
more capital on large crop farms. 
A summary judgment of the Colombian experience with mechanization 
would be that it has been an unfortunate investment with little to recommend 
it. It has yielded a negative social payoff and has acted to increase income 
inequality in a country which already had a highly skewed distribution of 
income before the investment took place. Elimination of the subsidy to 
mechanization should have the twofold benefit of equalizing income distribu- 
tion and augmenting the level of total income. Removal of subsidy could be 
effected by the levying of a tax on purchases of capital for large farms or by 
the imposition of higher interest rate charges on the loans granted to buyers 
of capital used on large farms. 
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V. LAND REFORM 
Although a measure of land reform occurred in the middle 1930s, it was not 
until 1961 that Colombia began serious efforts to increase the land base of 
small farmers. A creature of the comprehensive agrarian reform law of 1961 
was a new land reform institute, INCORA, which was vested with broad 
discretionary powers and multiple functions. INCORA was empowered to 
assist Colombia's numerous and impoverished small farmers through 
infrastructural investment in remote colonization areas, irrigation and 
drainageprojects, asupervised credit program, and, finally, through distribu- 
tion of land in the public domain as well as of private land acquired by gift, 
voluntary sale, or expropriation. With so many options from which to  
choose, INCORA has been characterized as more nearly resembling a rural 
development agency than a vehicle for substantial modification of land 
tenure conditions. To some, the multi-faceted nature of INCORA is lament- 
able, since other activities may be used as a substitute for land redistribution 
and may provide an excuse for diversion of its administrative energies and 
financial capacities. 
Among many distributive issues that might be considered, three have been 
singled out for discussion below. Could INCORA have been more effective 
in achieving its goals given the resources that were committed to it (INCORA 
receives about 20% of the total resources invested in agriculture from public 
revenue)? Will landless workers be helped or harmed by the efforts to im- 
prove income prospects for small farmers? What is the size of the gain in 
total agricultural output that a full-scale reform would bring, and what 
would be the division between land beneficiaries and urbbn consumers? 
From an income distribution point of view, it is important that INCORA 
be guided by efficiency considerations in choosing among projects related to 
land acquisition, land improvement, and land extension (colonization). The 
distribution impact of a fixed INCORA budget will be greatest if the funds 
are allocated to  the least costly methods of helping a poor rural family reach 
a particular income level. At current land prices it appears to  cost less (per 
family settled at a given income) to acquire land by outright purchase than 
to engage in relatively more expensive irrigation and drainage programs. 
Colonization projects appear to cost even more since they require the pro- 
vision of infrastructure which is already at least partially available in more 
settled parts of the country. If present cost estimates are valid, they suggest 
that INCORA could make more small farmers better off by spending more 
of its budget on large farm land acquisition and less on irrigation and 
colonization projects. 
It. is a somewhat puzzling feature of land reform programs that they do  
not extend to landless workers who are often at the bottom of the income 
scale. In CoIombia the approximately 10% of rural workers who are virtually 
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without any land have never been considered as a target group for land 
reform activities. If small farmers have surplus family labor prior to reform, 
they may employ smaller amounts of hired labor on land transferred to them 
by reform than the former owners employed on the same land. Thus a change 
in the pattern of land ownership in favor of small farmers may resuIt in a 
displacement of landless workers whose wages, employment, or both, 
would decline.' If this were to occur, land reform would have an ambiguous 
effect on income distribution, as incomes of small farmers would be en- 
hanced a t  the combined expense of richer large farmers and poor landless 
workers. Whether this is a likely outcome is an empirical matter which de- 
pends in part on the size of the land reform parcel. For very small sizes, the 
demand for landless labor may be reduced as the land is used to employ 
family members more fully. Drawing on data from farm level analysis, it 
appears that small farms employ somewhat more hired labor per hectare 
than larger farms producing the same crop in a given region. The main 
reason forthis result is that small farms engage in the production of relatively 
labor-intensive commodities, and, compared to  large farms, do not rely on 
labor-saving methods of production. This evidence indicates that landless 
workers will not be harmed by land reform and could conceivabIy be in 
greater demand if the large expropriated farms had specialized in crops 
with low labor intensity. 
A characteristic of Colombian agriculture is that larger farms tend to 
cultivate a smaller fraction of their land and operate with larger amounts of 
fallow than do small farms. Even though larger farms may enjoy higher 
yields on cultivated land, output per unit of total land area declines appre- 
ciably with increasing farm size. By combining underutilized land from large 
farms with underutilized labor from small farms, land reform should increase 
the level of total agricultural output. A more even distribution of labor than 
at present, and perhaps other variable inputs as well, over a given area of 
cultivated land, will have the same effect of raising total output. Estimates 
of this output contribution of land reform point to an increase on the order 
of about ten to fifteen percent. Urban food consumers, particularly low 
income ones, would share in this output benefit if marketed farm output also 
rose and relative food prices therefore declined. Estimates of the induced 
demand for food by small farmers, however, indicates that they will tend to 
capture all of the benefit from the gain in output. One cannot rule out the 
possibility that total marketed output will decline absolutely and reduce the 
real incomes of urban consumers of food. In fact, the poorer the land reform 
beneficiaries are, the greater is the probability of a smaller marketed output 
(because the owners themselves consume more), and the greater the prospect 
of harming the urban poor. 
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Many factors responsible for widely disparate rural incomes are in the end 
related to the skewed distribution of land ownership. A socially inefficient 
process of large farm mechanization would not have occurred if the initial 
distribution of land had been more equal. Moreover, deficiencies in the 
supply of rural education probably would have been remedied long ago if 
large landowners had resided on their farms and sent their children to local 
schools. Finally, price support policies would have a much less inequitable 
impact if they did not provide disproportionate rewards to some simply 
because they own more land and have more to sell than others. It is in this 
sense that land reform is the fundamental element in improving income 
distribution. Without it, many other policies affecting the rural sector make 
the distribution of income more unequal than it otherwise would be, 
VI. RURAL EDUCATION 
Two salient characteristics of the Colombian educational system are, first, 
the steadily growing participation a t  all levels of the population in the 
eligible age groups and, secondly, a marked disparity in educational oppor- 
tunity between the rural and urban sectors of the economy in favor of the 
latter. Since the end of World War If, enrollments at every educational level 
have been increasing faster than the rate of population growth. Hidden in 
the aggregate numbers, however, is a significant difference in the educational 
distributions for rural and urban groups. Compared to urban areas, rural 
zones suffer severely limited access to education. The percentage of school- 
aged children (under fifteen years) attending rural schools is about one-half 
as high as in the cities. In 1964 more than two-thirds of rural schools offered 
instruction only through the second grade, while almost all the others went 
up only to the third grade. In contrast, 62% of urban schools provided the 
full five years of primary school. Moreover, less than 10% of secondary 
schools are located in rural areas. 
Greater equality in educational opportunity would be expected under 
most conditions to generate a reduction in the inequality of labor incomes. 
Since the poor tend to participate in the Colombian educational system only 
at the primary level, an expansion of primary school enroIlments, especially 
in rural areas, should produce greater income equality. Conversely, if 
university and secondary education were expanded instead, middle and 
upper income groups would benefit disproportionately, with the result of a 
more unequal distribution of labor incomes. In a country where political 
power is concentrated in the hands of the rich, one might expect educational 
spending to under-invest in primary education benefiting the masses and to 
over-invest in higher education primarily benefiting the rich. Empirical 
studies of the rate of return to education in Colombia indicate the existence 
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of such an investment pattern in urban localities.8 The rate of return for 
urban primary schooling appears to be substantially higher than that for 
university education and well in excess of estimates of the opportunity cost 
of capital in the economy. In short, urban primary schooling is a profitable 
social investment, and considerations of economic efficiency would dictate 
larger expenditures for the education of the urban poor, which would raise 
their expected future incomes relative to the rest of the population. 
No data or study exists which would permit this conclusion to be extrapo- 
lated to the rural sector. Perhaps the most that can be said with current 
knowledge is that rural primary schooling will be a worthwhile investment if 
it equips students with the skills needed to obtain and hold urban jobs. One 
study hints of a basic conflict between equity and efficiency in the provision 
of rural education.9 It found that rural education had a significant payoff 
only in the rich, well-endowed regions of the country. In those areas primary 
education assisted small farmers in making more profitable production 
decisions because the correct production choice could result in much larger 
profits. In the poorer regions of the country, growth in output is severely 
constrained by adverse topography and poor soils which cannot be altered 
or offset by farmers' production decisions. The problem is that education 
seems to be complementary to inputs that are either missing or in deficient 
supply on farms in the poorest regions. Without them more education may 
not be helpful. 
VII. SUMMARY 
Agricultural price supports, land reform, credit allocation, farm mechani- 
zation, and rural education comprise a diverse set of policies whose analysis 
would not ordinarily share a single theme. My review of research in these 
separate areas has attempted to show that a more equal distribution of 
income in Colombian agriculture is not inconsistent with the achievement 
of higher levels of output. In most areas of policymaking there is some 
scope for better performance with regard to both equity and economic 
efficiency. In many cases what is required to achieve this end is an adjust- 
ment in current agricultural policies so as to give small farmers improved 
opportunities to acquire productive inputs and to remove from large farmers 
their privileged access to the same resources. If this were to  happen the 
distinction between economic growth and development probably would no 
longer have to be made in describing the changes in the behavior of Colom- 
bian agriculture. Finally, a policy adjustment in the direction indicated 
would have the desirable effect of raising the demand for rural labor, in- 
creasing rural incomes, and thus of limiting the tide of rural-to-urban migra- 
tion to a level that the cities could absorb without severe economic stress 
and dislocation. 
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